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The Recognition of the Syrian National Coalition under International Law:
Whether the National Coalition Can Receive Arms
Daniel Strashun
I. Introduction

In December of 2010, a Tunisian street vendor set himself on fire in front of a
government building in Tunisia in response to the humiliating confiscation of his goods.1 This
act sparked protests that quickly spread to Tunisia’s capital and caused Tunisian President Zine
al-Abidine Ben Ali to flee to Saudi Arabia. 2 The Tunisian uprising was the first genuine
revolution in the Arab world, which later provoked the ouster of the leaders of Egypt, Yemen
and Libya.3 It was generally believed that the uprisings in the Arab world would not spread to
Syria because the Syrian government had the support of its religious minorities and had a
previous reputation of torturing dissidents.4 Yet, on March 15, 2013, the Syrian Arab Spring
marked its second anniversary.
After two years of fighting, the Syrian uprising has created a humanitarian crisis that has
resulted in the death of over 70,000 Syrians and the displacement of almost three and a half
million refugees.5 In addition, over two million Syrian children have been ravaged by disease,

1

JAMES L. GELVIN, THE ARAB UPRISINGS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 27 (2012)
[hereinafter GELVIN].
2
Id.
3
Associated Press, A Nation-by-Nation Look at Arab Spring Dictators and Their Fate,
HAARETZ, Jun 2, 2012, http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/a-nation-by-nation-look-atarab-spring-dictators-and-their-fate-1.433990.
4
GELVIN, Supra, note 1, at 102.
5
Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet, U.S. Government Assistance
to Syria, Mar. 4, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/205623.htm. [hereinafter March
2013 Fact Sheet].

malnutrition and trauma.6 Some foreign policy scholars predict that the Syrian infighting could
continue for more than three years before it is resolved.7
Since 1970, when Hafez al-Assad, an Alawi military officer, led a coup d’état and
overthrew the Syrian president, the Assad family has notoriously governed Syria through the use
of barbaric tactics to ensure the obedience and loyalty of it citizens.8 For example, from 1979
until 1982, the Sunni Muslims led an unsuccessful insurrection that took place in Aleppo and
Hama.9 After the Muslim Brotherhood unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate Assad, Assad’s
younger brother, Rifaat called for an all out war and proclaimed that the regime would be ready
to kill one million Syrians to defend its rule.10 Ultimately, the revolt was suppressed, but not
before the Syrian military was accused of murdering tens of thousands of civilians.11 In 2000,
Hafez al-Assad passed away and his son Bashar succeeded him, continuing his father’s legacy.12
According to the Human Rights Watch, the Assad regime established 27 “torture centers” in

6

Holly Yan, The Cost of War: 2 million Syrian Children Afflicted by Trauma, Disease,
Malnutrition, CNN, Mar. 13, 2013, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/13/world/meast/syria-civil-war-children.
7
Interview by Bernard Gwertzman with Ed Husain, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies,
Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY (November 14, 2012) available at
http://www.cfr.org/syria/no-easy-answers-syria/p29473.
8
FOUAD AJAMI, THE SYRIAN REBELLION, 28, (2012) [hereinafter THE SYRIAN REBELLION]. see
Jerrold M. Post and Ruthie Pertsis, Bashar al-Assad is Every Bit His Father's Son, FOREIGN
POLICY, Dec. 20, 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/20/bashar_al_assad_is_every_bit_his_father_s_s
on; see also Amnesty International, Syria: New report finds systemic and widespread torture and
ill-treatment in detention, March 14, 2012, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/syria-new-reportfinds-systemic-and-widespread-torture-and-ill-treatment-detention-2012-03-13.
9
Id. at 39-40.
10
Id.at 40.
11
BBC, Syria Profile, March 5, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14703995
[hereinafter Syria Profile].
12
Id.
2

Syria. 13 Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan controversially referred to Bashar Assad’s
recent “cruelty that was a response to people in Hama, Homs and Deraa” as the inheritance he
received from his father.14
While Bashar Assad’s government continues to rule Syria, the Syrian opposition
movement in Syria has increased its legitimacy. In November 2012, several of the major
opposition forces united as the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition
Forces (“the National Coalition”). The National Coalition continues to gain international support
and has been internationally recognized by the United States, the United Kingdom, France and
the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) as the “legitimate representative” of the Syrian people.15
While these acts of recognition were an important preliminary step for the National Coalition, it
does not allow the international community to grant the rebels lethal aid. 16 This paper will
explore the critical issue of why the Syrian insurgency has not been able to receive military aid
to date, even though it achieved international recognition.
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Ole Salvange et al., Torture Archipelago Arbitrary Arrests, Torture, and Enforced
Disappearances in Syria’s Underground Prisons since March 2011, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
July 3, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/07/03/torture-archipelago; see Op-ed, Fouad
Ajami, Syria’s War Hits the House of Assad, WALL STREET JOURNAL, July 18, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444873204577534952033063684.html; see
also Reuters, Syria Running Torture Centre Network - Rights Group, July 3, 2012,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/03/uk-syria-rights-idUKBRE86205S20120703.
14
THE SYRIAN REBELLION, Supra, note 4, at 101. See The Human Rights Crisis in Syria:
Hearing Before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Comm., 112th Cong. 43 (2012) (statement of
Radwan Ziadeh, Visiting Scholar, Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University)(stating the scale of torture and other ill-treatment in Syria has risen to a level not
witnessed for years and is reminiscent of the dark era of the 1970s and 1980s).
15
Syria Profile, Supra, note 11. see also Aljazeera, GCC Recognizes New Syrian Opposition
Bloc, Nov, 12, 2012,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/20121112175539534504.html. The GCC
represents Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait.
16
John B. Bellinger III, Op-Ed, U.N. Rules and Syrian Intervention, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2013,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-17/opinions/36410395_1_syrian-opposition-assadregime-intervention. [hereinafter U.N. Rules].
3

Section II of this paper will explain what “recognition” means and what the different
levels of recognition accomplish under international law. It will also apply the concept of
recognition to the events of the Libyan Arab Spring. Section III will trace the development of
the opposition’s formation of the National Coalition. Section IV will analyze the current legal
status of the National Coalition under international law and will explain why the rebels have not
been able to receive military aid even though they gained international recognition. Section V
will offer suggestions for the success of the National Coalition and potential roadblocks it will
encounter under international law. Finally, Section VI will offer predictions for the future of the
Syrian opposition movement and discuss its connection to the greater Arab Spring movement.

II.

Background of the Principle of International Recognition

A. The Legal Background of the Principle of International Recognition

The principle of “recognition” does not have an established, consistent definition and is
an “eccentric area [that] is subject to various pronouncements of varying degrees of
generality.” 17 As British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once wrote to United States
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt concerning the recognition of the French Committee of
National Liberation: “What does recognition mean? One can recognize a man as an Emperor or
as a grocer. Recognition is meaningless without a defining formula.”18 The act of “recognition”

17

Ian Brownlie, Recognition in Theory and Practice, 53 BYBIL 197-198, 201 (1982).
[hereinafter, Brownlie].
18
2 WINSTON CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 137 (1954); II FRUS 173.
4

of a new government by an established government has multiple meanings with varied levels of
legal and political significance depending on its context.19
“Diplomatic recognition,” the most legally significant form of recognition, refers to the
willingness of the recognizing state to enter into a formal diplomatic relationship with the newly
created entity. 20 It allows the two governments to exchange ambassadors and to establish
embassies and makes the newly formed entity responsible for treaty obligations.21 In addition,
under the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, the recognized
government would be obligated to physically protect the recognizing government’s embassy and
provide freedom of access to the embassy for all foreign nationals.22 Recognition could also be
an informal means of expressing political support for the new entity or a way to express an
opinion on the group’s legal standing.23
An insurgent group can be “recognized” under two legally significant standards. It can
be recognized as either the “representative of a nation’s people” or as the “representative of a
state.” Recognition of an insurgent group as the “representatives of a nation’s people” implies

19

Stefan Talmon, “Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council,” American Society
of International Law Insights 15 (16) (2011), 1. [hereinafter, Recognition].
20
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 202 (1987) (Recognition of
statehood is a formal acknowledgment by another state that an entity possesses the qualifications
for statehood as set forth in § 201, and implies a commitment to treat that entity as a state); see
e.g. Address of US Secretary of State Acheson to the Pan American Society of the USA, New
York, Sept 19, 1949, “our long-range objectives … may, in fact, be best served by recognizing it
[the new government] and thus maintaining a channel of communication with the country
involved….our act of recognition need not necessarily be understood as the forerunner of a
policy of intimate cooperation with the government concerned” (Whiteman (ed.), Digest of
International Law (1963), ii, 5.
21
Recognition, Supra, note 19.
22
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22, April 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered
into force Apr. 24, 1964)[hereinafter, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations]; Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations art. 5, adopted Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (entered into
force with respect to the United States of America Dec. 14, 1967).
23
Recognition, Supra, note 19, at 2.
5

the entity did not satisfy the legal criteria necessary to be recognized as a state and the
recognition is not legally or diplomatically significant.24 It represents a politically significant
event that can boost the morale of the insurgents.25
Stefan Talmon, professor of Public International Law at Oxford University, argues that
the recognition of an insurgent group as the “representatives of a nation’s people” provides it
with four key political advantages:
(1) it grants legitimacy to their struggle against the incumbent government; (2) it
provides international acceptance; (3) it allows the insurgents to speak on behalf
on the nation’s people in international organizations and allows it to represent it in
other States by opening “representative offices;” and (4) usually results in the
grant of economic aid.26
In contrast, recognition of an insurgency as the “representative of a state” demonstrates that the
insurgent group represents the nation in some legal or diplomatic capacity.27 Consequently, the
recognizing state must de-recognize the incumbent government and end formal diplomatic
relations with the incumbent government.28 That includes handing over the foreign embassy to
the insurgents, and if requested to do so by the insurgents, ending the diplomatic status of the
incumbent government’s diplomats.29
In 1947, Hersh Lauterpacht, a former member of the United Nations’ International Law
Commission and a former judge of the International Court of Justice, developed the following
four pre-conditions necessary to recognize insurgent movements:

24

see Brownlie, Supra, note 17, at 198.
Jill Dougherty, What Will Recognizing the Opposition Accomplish, CNN SECURITY
CLEARANCE BLOG, Dec. 11, 2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/11/recognizing-thesyrian-opposition-what-does-it-really-mean/.
26
Recognition, Supra, note 19, at 2.
27
Id. at 3
28
Id.
29
Id.
25
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First, there must exist within the State an armed conflict of a general (as distinguished
from a purely local) character; secondly, the insurgents must occupy and administer a
portion of national territory; thirdly, they must conduct the hostilities in accordance with
the rules of war and through organized armed forces acting under a responsible authority;
fourthly, there must exist circumstances which make it necessary for outside States to
define their attitude by means of recognition of belligerency.30
Recognizing states rarely use Lauterpacht’s criteria as a formal means of recognition.31
The criteria to qualify for insurgent recognition does not have to be established by
international law.32 For example, African nations began to seek independence from their former
European colonists. In 1963, the Organization of African Unity’s Coordinating Committee for
the Liberation of Africa (the “OAU”) developed criteria to recognize insurgents as the sole
legitimate representative of a people.33 An insurgent group that fulfilled these criteria would be
eligible for financial and moral assistance.34
The OAU established that the insurgency must be a “United Action Front” fighting
against the incumbent power, meaning it must be “broadly based, have effective following and
popular support” throughout the country and “have reasonable fighting strength.” 35 Stated
differently, a state can recognize an insurgency if it has the authority to “control and govern a
substantial part of the state territory” and has the power to “engage in a widespread armed
30

Hersh Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 176-178 (1947).
See Sam Foster Halabi, Traditions of Belligerent Recognition: The Libyan Intervention in
Historical and Theoretical Context, 27 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 321, 332 (2012) (quoting Richard A.
Falk, The Six Legal Dimensions of the Vietnam War) (1968)).
32
STEFAN TALMON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: WITH
PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GOVERNMENTS IN EXILE 30 n. 48 (2001) [hereinafter Talmon].
33
General Report of the Goodwill Mission of the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of
Africa to the Angolan Nationalists, Léopoldville, July 13-15, 1964, reprinted in John A. Marcum,
the Angolan Revolution vol 2: exile, politics and guerilla warfare (1962-1976), Appendix 2, at
304-307.
34
Talmon, Supra, note 32.
35
Mohamed A.E. Yousef, “Security Council Resolution 1973: A New Interpretation of the
Notion of Protection of Civilians?” in 82 ARAB SPRING: NEW PATTERNS FOR DEMOCRACY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 160 (ed., 2013).
31

7

conflict.” 36 These criteria are helpful to understand the complexities of recognition of the
insurgent groups in the context of the Libyan and Syrian Arab Spring.

B. Insurgent Recognition Applied to the Libyan Arab Spring

In the context of the Libyan Arab Spring, some countries in the international community
recognized the Libyan National Transitional Council (“NTC”) even though it did not completely
fulfill these criteria. The Libyan Arab Spring began in mid-February of 2011 when the Libyan
people began to riot in Benghazi in response to the arrest of human rights activist Fethi Tarbel,
who had worked to free political prisoners.37 Only a few weeks later, on March 5, 2011, the
NTC met in Benghazi and declared itself as the “sole representative for Libya.”38
On March 10, 2011, France became the first country to recognize the rebel forces as the
“legitimate representative of the Libyan people.”39 Then, on March 28, 2011, Qatar became the
first Arab nation to recognize the Libyan rebels as the “legitimate representative of the Libyan
people.”40 By mid-June of 2011, Turkey, Jordan, Germany and Spain also recognized the rebels
as the “legitimate representative of the Libyan people.”41

36

Liesbeth Zegveld, The Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 2. [hereinafter Zegveld].
37
Reuters, Timeline: Libya's Uprising against Muammar Gaddafi, Aug. 21, 2011, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/21/us-libya-events-idUSTRE77K2QH2011082.
[hereinafter Timeline].
38
Id.
39
Alan Cowell and Steven Erlanger, France Becomes First Country to Recognize Libyan Rebels,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/europe/11france.html?_r=0. [hereinafter Cowell and
Erlanger].
40
Timeline, Supra, note 37.
41
Recognition, Supra, note 19, at 2.
8

Under international law, a nation can only have one de jure government.42 A nation,
however, can have one de jure government and a representative of the nation’s people or a de
facto government. 43

The recognition of the Libyan rebels, however, did not affect the

recognizing nations’ official diplomatic relations with the Qaddafi regime.44 At that time, the
Qaddafi regime remained the only Libyan government that had the authority to appoint Libyan
ambassadors, “legally dispose of Libyan state assets abroad” and legally transfer title to State
controlled oil and gas resources.45
Until the summer of 2011, the United States did not to grant any form of recognition to
the NTC. In April 2011, the United States Ambassador to Libya stated, “Recognition remains a
legal and an international obligations issue that we’re still studying, and we have not made a
definitive determination on that question… [W]e’re a very legalistic country and we’re looking
at all the different complexity… of that question.”46 He further remarked there were issues with
respect to “what constitutes a government” and what constitutes “precedence in United States
history for recognition.”47 Even as late as May 12, 2011, the United States remained hesitant to
recognize the Libyan rebels and felt there were potential “legal hurdles” to recognition.48
For the past few decades, the foreign policy of the United States, the United Kingdom
and most other countries has been to only recognize newly created “states,” but not newly
42

Id. A de jure government is “[a] functioning government that is legally established.”
GOVERNMENT, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), de jure government.
43
Id. A de facto government is “[a]n independent government established and exercised by a
group of a country's inhabitants who have separated themselves from the parent state.”
GOVERNMENT, Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009), de facto government.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Press Release, U.S. State Department, The Political Situation in Libya, Special Briefing, Gene
Cretz, Ambassador to Libya (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/161878.htm.
47
Id.
48
U.S. State Department, Daily Press Briefing, Statement by Mark C. Toner, Acting Dept.
Spokesman (May 12, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2011/05/163280.htm.
9

formed “governments.”49 For example, if a new “geographic territory comes into existence,”
such as Kosovo or Montenegro, the United States would decide whether to recognize the new
state.50 The United States and most other countries have generally avoided getting involved with
the complicated diplomatic issues of recognizing insurgencies as legitimate governments.51
The United States State Department likely believed that “legal hurdles” to recognition
existed because recognition of the NTC would constitute an “unusual departure” from its prior
diplomatic practice of not recognizing insurgencies in any form.52 In addition, the NTC did not
have broad popular support throughout Libya and did not control or govern a substantial part of
the Libyan territory.53 Politically and geographically, it was not “truly inclusive” of the Libyan
people.54 If the United States had recognized the NTC without the NTC’s fulfillment of those
criteria, it likely would have constituted an “illegal interference” in the internal affairs of Libya,
a violation of the non-intervention principle of the Charter of the United Nations.55

49

John B. Bellinger III, Legal Questions in U.S. Nod to Libya's Opposition, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (July 18, 2011), available at http://www.cfr.org/libya/legal-questions-us-nodlibyas-opposition/p25489?cid=oth_partner_site-atlantic-firstake-legal_questions_in_us_ nod_to071811. [hereinafter Legal Questions].
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
U.N. Rules, Supra, note 16.
53
Legal Questions, Supra, note 49.
54
William Wan and William Booth, United States Recognizes Libyan Rebels as Legitimate
Government, WASH. POST, July 15, 2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-0715/world/35237622_1_rebel-council-libyan-rebel-mahmoud-shammam. [hereinafter Wan and
Booth].
55
See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, princ. 2, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970), http://daccess
ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/RES/2625(XXV)&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION
(stating that “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed
intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the
State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are in violation of international
law.”) [hereinafter Declaration on Principles of International Law].
10

Yet, on July 15, 2011, the United States formally recognized the NTC as the “legitimate
government of Libya.”56 The United Kingdom followed the United States and proclaimed the
NTC as the “sole governmental authority” in Libya and dismissed all Qaddafi diplomats. 57
Under international law, an insurgent group can only be formally recognized as the government
of a state if it exercised “effective control over the State’s territory.”58 As of June 2011, the NTC
controlled only the eastern parts of Libya, but the Qaddafi government retained control of
Tripoli, the capital, and the western parts.59 At the time the United States recognized the NTC, it
did not control a “substantial part” of Libyan territory and could not claim to have “broad
support” among the Libyan people.60
According to John B. Bellinger III, a former legal adviser to the State Department, the
United States recognition of the NTC was “especially unusual” under international law because
the NTC did not fulfill the criteria necessary for recognition as a de jure government. 61 In
addition, although the United States declared that the Qaddafi regime “no longer has any
legitimate authority in Libya,” the regime was still a functioning government.62 The recognition
thus also raised serious concerns concerning the principle of non-intervention.
The State Department was aware of the legal challenges that recognition of the NTC
would raise. Former United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton astutely cautioned that
there were “various legal issues that remain to be worked through.”63 Less than a month before

56

Timeline, Supra, note 37.
BBC News, UK Expels Gaddafi diplomats and Recognizes Libya Rebels, July 27, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14306544. [hereinafter UK Expels].
58
Recognition, Supra, note 19, at 4.
59
Id.
60
Legal Questions, Supra, note 49.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
57
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the United States decided to recognize the NTC, Harold Koh, the legal adviser to the State
Department during President Barack Obama’s first term, remarked:
“As a general rule, we are reluctant to recognize entities that do not control entire
countries because then they are responsible for parts of the country that they don’t
control…[a]nd we are reluctant to de-recognize leaders who still control parts of the
country because then you’re absolving them of responsibility in the areas that they do
control.”64
The “legal issues” that the United States dealt with related to the international obligations
of Libya, such as who had responsibility for Libya’s treaty obligations.65 In addition, there were
concerns the Qaddafi regime would be absolved from liability under the Vienna Convention and
international human rights laws.66 There were also diplomatic consequences of recognition such
as whether the United States would enter into formal diplomatic relations with the NTC. 67
However, Qaddafi was killed in October of 2011; and in August of 2012, the NTC transferred
their power to a newly elected assembly, ending the legal debate.68
The United States recognized the NTC, even though they knew it would raise many
complicated international law questions.69 Bellinger III claimed recognition of the NTC would
be a means to provide it with greater political support, since the United States military support
for the NTC was minimal. 70 Similarly, William Hague, the Foreign Secretary of the United

64

Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong., 39
(2011) (statement of Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State).
65
Legal Questions, Supra, note 49.
66
Jason Ukman, U.S. Recognition of New Libyan Government Raises Tough Legal Questions,
WASH. POST CHECKPOINT, July 19, 2011, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpointwashington/post/us-recognition-of-new-libyan-government-raises-tough-legalquestions/2011/07/19/gIQAb9BdNI_blog.html. [hereinafter, Ukman].
67
Legal Questions, Supra, note 49.
68
BBC, Libya's NTC Hands Power to Newly Elected Assembly, August 9, 2012,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19183300.
69
Legal Questions, Supra, note 49.
70
Ukman, Supra, note 66.
12

Kingdom, maintained that the United Kingdom recognized the NTC as the “sole governmental
authority” of Libya because it was a “unique situation.”71 Both the United States and the United
Kingdom believed that recognition of the NTC would allow their governments to economically
benefit the NTC through the ability to turn over frozen Libyan assets to the NTC, the recognized
government of Libya.72
Despite concerns by members of the United States Congress that the recognition of the
NTC was “premature” and there would be no accountability for the transfer of the unfrozen
assets, the United States felt recognition was critical politically. 73 The turning point to the
decision of the United States to grant recognition to the NTC was a presentation given in Turkey
that outlined the rebels’ plan for a government that would be inclusive of the Libyan nation in a
post-Qaddafi Libya.74 The legal recognition of the NTC as the “legitimate government of Libya”
was an oddity in foreign policy, and it remains to be seen if it will be relied upon as diplomatic
precedent for recognition of an insurgent group. Although the OAU criteria for insurgent
recognition were not closely followed by the recognizing nations during the recognition of the
NTC, they were adhered to in the recognition of the Syrian insurgency.

III. Development of the National Coalition’s Formation

In early March of 2011, a group of Syrian boys ages 10 to 15 scribbled some anti-Assad
graffiti on the walls in Dara’a and were subsequently abused and tortured by Syrian military

71

UK Expels, Supra, note 57.
Id.
73
Wan and Booth, Supra, note 54.
74
Id.
72
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officials. 75 In response to the disproportional brutality, the people of Dera’a protested the
regime’s actions chanting “peaceful, peaceful,” thus sparking the Syrian uprising.76 These antiregime protests quickly spread to Banyas, Homs and the suburbs of Damascus, where the Assad
regime responded through the use of military tanks to crush these protests.77
In October of 2011, in an attempt to create a united front against the Assad regime,
opposition forces formed the Syrian National Council (the “SNC”). 78 The SNC sought to
represent an inclusive cross-section of Syria society and consisted of six members from the local
coordination committees, five members from the Muslim Brotherhood and the tribes, five
“independents,” four Kurds, four liberal secularists, one Christian, and one Assyrian.79
Instead of focusing its efforts on gaining internal legitimacy within Syria, the SNC hoped
securing external recognition would boost its credibility within Syria. 80 The SNC became
dependent on international support and failed to create sustainable political leadership on the
ground in Syria.81 In addition, the SNC failed to unify the numerous rebel militias, a condition
the Friends of Syria (“FOS”) nations placed on the SNC before they would grant it financial
assistance. Thus the SNC could not claim to represent the “bulk of the opposition.”82

75

THE SYRIAN REBELLION, Supra, note 8, at 73-74.
Id. at 74.
77
Syria Profile, Supra, note 11.
78
The Guardian, Syria's Rebels Unite to Oust Assad and Push for Democracy, Oct. 2, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/02/syria-rebels-assad-national-council.
79
THE SYRIAN REBELLION, Supra, note 8, at 133.
80
Yezid Sayigh, The Syrian Opposition’s Leadership Problem 4-5, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INT’L PEACE, April 3, 2013, http://carnegie-mec.org/2013/04/03/syrian-opposition-s-leadershipproblem/fx6u. [hereinafter, Leadership Problem].
81
Id. at 5.
82
Id. at 9.
76
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The SNC also sought to gain control over the large but unstructured Free Syrian Army
(the “FSA”), which was led by defecting Air Force Colonel Riad al-Assad.83 In September of
2011, the SNC attempted to create a Joint Military Command of Revolutionary Military
Councils, which would control 75 to 80 percent of the armed rebels, but it could not persuade the
prominent Islamic brigades or credible commanders such as the heads of the Homs and Aleppo
Military Councils to join their “unified command.”84
Ultimately, the SNC did not unify the opposition because it could not gain support from
“key minorities, religious and tribal figures,” the business community or the rebel fighters.85 The
SNC’s inability to unify the opposition led Hilary Clinton to declare that the SNC could “no
longer be viewed as the visible leader of the opposition” and the Western nations did not trust it
to distribute any contributions for humanitarian assistance.86
The Syrian opposition sought to create a more diversified body that could earn
widespread international recognition and domestic legitimacy.87 Seeking military and economic
aid, in November of 2012, about 90 percent of the opposition groups, including the SNC, united
to form the 60 seat National Coalition.88 It reserved seats for various ethnic and minority groups
that were absent from the SNC, including three for the Kurdish community represented by the
National Kurdish Council, three for the Turkmen community and one for the Syria Business
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Forum.89 The National Coalition also reserved seats for representatives of each of Syria’s 14
provinces and reserved up to five seats for the Alawite Community, an important minority group,
because President Assad is a member of that sect of Shiite Muslims.90 However, jihadist rebel
groups, such as the Jabhat al-Nusra refused to join the National Coalition.91
Although the National Coalition claimed to “more broadly” represent the opposition than
the SNC, the facts do not support the claim.92 The opposition inside Syria holds 20 percent of
the seats in the general secretariat, the leadership body of National Coalition, and a slightly lower
figure than the 35 percent it held in the leadership body of the SNC.93 In addition, although the
National Council allocated 14 seats to the representatives from each of Syria’s 14 provinces,
only two of these representatives were physically based in Syria.94
At the National Coalition’s first general assembly in Cairo, SNC members and associates
constituted 60 percent of the delegates and failed to gain representation from the Syrian Kurdish
Opposition parties. 95 The National Coalition’s composition led one commentator to remark,
“there was a large element of make-believe,” when the FOS recognized the National Coalition as
the “sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people,” when it previously denied recognition
to the SNC.96
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IV. Current Legal Status of the National Coalition

When United States President Barack Obama recognized the National Coalition as the
“legitimate representative of the Syrian people in opposition to the Assad regime,” he referred to
it as a “big step.” 97 It was a politically and economically significant event for the National
Coalition to receive international recognition as the “representatives of the Syrian people.” That
designation, however, did not create any “new legal basis” for the United States to arm the
Syrian rebels or intervene militarily against the Assad regime.98
The United States may be able to arm an insurgent group, without violating the nonintervention principle of the United Nations, if the entity qualifies as a state.99 As a signatory to
the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, the United States can only
recognize a state if it fulfills four criteria.100 The entity seeking recognition must have (a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory the group controls; (c) a governing structure; and
(d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.101
The only way under international law the United States may find it legal to directly arm
the rebels with lethal assistance is if the National Coalition gains control of a substantial part of
Syrian territory and becomes “more inclusive and can legitimately claim to represent the
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majority of Syrians.” 102 If the National Coalition fulfills those criteria and then requests
weapons, there might be a legal basis for intervention in the Syrian conflict.103 Currently, any
foreign military assistance or intervention would be viewed as an “illegal interference” into the
internal affairs of Syria, a violation of the second principle of the Charter of the United
Nations.104
President Obama granted the National Coalition political recognition because the United
States determined that it was “reflective and representative enough of the Syrian people.” 105
Similarly, the United Kingdom recognized the National Coalition because it formed “a broad and
representative Opposition that reflects the full diversity of the Syrian people.” 106

The

international community was thus able to support the new Coalition because it increased its
legitimacy and credibility among women, minorities, religious leaders, civil society and was able
to gain the participation of the local councils.107
Although the Syrian National Coalition gained political recognition as the “legitimate
representative of the Syrian people,” it has not received any formal diplomatic recognition.
Unlike in the case of the Libyan uprising, neither the United States nor any other nation has been
willing to formally recognize the Syrian opposition movement as the “government of Syria.”108
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The international community continues to maintain formal diplomatic relations with the Assad
government and treats his regime as the legal government of Syria.109
France, one of the first nations to supply the Libyan Transitional Council with financial
assistance and military support, believed the Syria rebels have not “been as organized and have
no hold on significant amounts of territory,” sufficient to serve as the government of Syria. 110
Although France granted permission to the National Coalition to appoint an ambassador to
France, the new ambassador will not be able to use the Syrian embassy in France because it
belongs to the Assad government.111
The Arab world has been more supportive of the National Coalition. In February of
2013, Qatar became the first nation to hand over a Syrian embassy and to provide full diplomatic
status to the ambassador from the National Coalition. 112 A month later, the Arab League
formally handed over Syria’s seat to the National Coalition and allowed its member nations to
arm the Syrian rebels.113 The National Coalition will not be able to acquire Syria’s seat in the
United Nations, however, because Russia and China will likely block any attempts.114 At this
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time, therefore, further diplomatic recognition will not help the National Coalition gain any
further legitimacy.115
The National Coalition can further increase its legitimacy by acquiring “control and
governance” of a substantial part of Syrian territory.116 Although the National Coalition claims
to control territory that covers 100,000 square kilometers and includes 10 million residents or 40
percent of the population, it must demonstrate it can adequately govern these areas better than
the Islamic rebels.117 Currently, the opposition forces have “the upper hand” in the northern and
eastern parts of Syria.118 The rebels also control over half of Aleppo, Syria’s largest city and
most of the border crossings with Turkey and Iraq.119 But the Assad government has maintained
control over the coasts and the Alawite Mountains and has fought off the rebels in Damascus.120
In addition, President Assad still has considerable support from the Syrian population, but it
remains to be seen if his support will be sustained.121
Many Christians, which constitute 10 percent of the population, and significant numbers
of Druze and Kurds, support Assad because they believe he will protect the minorities better than
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the Sunni opposition.122 In addition, the Alawite community, which constitutes 12 percent of the
Syrian population, supports the Assad regime because he is an Alawite.123
The Alawites were a traditionally disadvantaged group prior to the Assad regime, but
under the Assad regime they maintain a prominent role in the Syrian military and society and
would be afraid to lose their privileged stature under a potentially Sunni Muslim government.124
Although there have been considerable defections from the Syrian army, the Assad government
has benefited from strong military support.125 Similar to the Arab Spring protests in Bahrain, if
Assad can keep control of the military, the opposition will have a tough time ousting Assad.126
The United States believes the National Coalition must increase its legitimacy among the
Syrian people and continue to prove that it can be a viable alternative to the Assad
government.127 If the National Coalition can continue to unify itself, be inclusive of a broader
range of Syrian communities and isolate the extremist elements of the opposition, there is a
better chance the international community will feel it is legally permissible to arm the rebels.128
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Alternatively, the United States might be able to arm the rebels or militarily intervene in
Syria using the precedent that the Clinton administration established with the 1999 NATO
bombing campaign of Kosovo, which protected the Kosovars from further “ethnic cleansing”
perpetrated by the Serbs and Slobodan Milosevic.129 Although most international lawyers did
not view the intervention in Kosovo as “strictly legal,” they found it morally legitimate. 130
However, if the humanitarian atrocities continue in Syria, and the National Coalition does not
meet the qualifications for recognition as the “government of Syria,” the United States may feel
intervention is “morally, if not legally” justified.131
In March of 1999, after 300,000 Kosovars had been expelled from their homes and
“ethnic cleansing” was commonly occurring, President Clinton authorized a NATO air strike
against Serbia. 132 NATO conducted more than 30,000 sorties over 11 weeks and impaired
Serbia’s ability to wage war on the Kosovars.133 That campaign took place entirely without the
authorization of the U.N. Security Council.134 In addition, the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia indicted Milosevic for crimes against humanity.135 The joint military
and diplomatic campaign forced Serbia to withdraw its troops from Kosovo.136 The campaign’s
success allowed 700,000 Kosovars to return home two weeks after the fighting ended.137
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In addition, the international community used this humanitarian model to authorize an
Australian led military force to help East Timor in their secession from Indonesia in 1999.138
Similar regional military forces with the assistance of the U.N. or European powers were used to
protect citizens in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast).139
Similar to Kosovo, Syria faces an immense humanitarian crisis. Almost three and a half
million Syrians have been displaced from their homes.140 If diplomacy fails, President Obama
might be able to apply the moral precedent used in Kosovo and intervene in Syria to prevent
further massacres.141

V. Suggestions for the National Coalition and Potential Problems

The long-term viability of the National Coalition will be based on its ability to expand its
operations from exile in Cairo and develop a governing structure on the ground in Syria that can
lead the Syrian people.142 It must take a proactive role in shaping the future of all diplomatic,
political and military decisions in Syria, whether or not the Assad government falls.143
In December of 2012, the National Coalition formed a military arm with the Supreme
Military Council that has the support of 260 rebel commanders.144 In order to demonstrate their
effectiveness as a broad based governing body, the National Coalition must further expand its
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military arm and unite it with the Free Syrian Army and other rebel groups.145 This body must
establish itself as a moderate opposition movement that can control the fighters and prevent the
jihadist rebels from gaining control of Syrian territory.146
Although there is no official count of rebel brigades, they have been prominently
involved in crucial battles in Aleppo, Homs and Damascus.147 The jihadists rebels, however,
could represent as much as half of the armed rebels and have joined forces to form the Liberation
Front for Syria. 148 The Islamist brigades also have been receiving the majority of the arms
shipments that Qatar and Saudi Arabia donated to the rebels.149
The potential that the fall of Assad could create a vacuum that would allow Al-Qaeda and
other Sunni Muslims extremists to gain control of Syria has caused hesitation in the international
community’s support for the National Coalition.150 Some commentators even believe that the
only certain outcome from the Syrian uprising is that the jihadists will have a major presence in
Syria.151
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In addition, the National Coalition must also gain the trust and respect of the minorities
including Alawites, Christians, Druze and Kurds.152 It must be able to convince them that it can
function as a viable government that will protect the rights of those groups in case the Assad
government falls. The National Coalition must begin to demonstrate their effectiveness as a
future transitional government by securely delivering medical and humanitarian aid to the four
million Syrians who are in need of assistance.153 As National Coalition Chairman al-Khatib
admitted, “much of the relief aid has been stolen or looted by gangs exploiting the security
anarchy.”154
The National Coalition must improve the delivery of humanitarian aid or the Islamist
rebel groups who have been quicker and more efficient delivering humanitarian aid to the rebel
controlled areas will dominate any transitional body.155 These issues have led to limited nonlethal aid for the National Coalition and the recent resignation of Mouaz al-Khatib, the leader of
the National Coalition since its beginning stages.156 If the National Coalition can successfully
adopt these measures, it will play a much more prominent role in Syria’s future.

VI. Larger Lessons from the Syrian Arab Spring
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The so-called Arab Spring has been portrayed in the media as “popular uprisings with
democratic aspirations.”157 Revolutions usually consist of “many groups hostile to the existing
government, but not necessarily for the same reason.”158 In the case of the Syria uprising, former
United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argues that the Syrian Arab Spring is not a
battle between democracy and a dictatorship, but a “fight of various ethnic groups for
preeminence.”159
Although one report found that out of the Arab Spring countries, Libya had the smallest
hope for democracy, the Syrian people’s chance for developing a true democracy are not that
much greater.160 In a post-Assad world, the lack of existing political structures in Syria will
present great obstacles in the establishment of any model of democratic governance.161 Since the
Syrian people have suffered under a quasi-totalitarian rule for 43 years, they will face an uphill
battle to establish a political system, a democracy or authoritarian rule. 162 According to the
2011-2012 World Press Freedom Index, Syria is ranked 176th out of 179 nations in press
freedom.163 Syria was also ranked 164th out of 167 nations on the Economist’s 2012 Democracy
Index.164
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Unlike Libya, the Syrian Revolution is not a conflict between the Assad regime and the
rest of the nation.165 Both the Assad government and the rebels have supporters, and there are
many Syrians who do not like the regime, but are concerned about a future Syria under a jihadist
rule.166 If it was a classical revolution to overthrow a dictator, some argue, Assad would be dead
or out of power.167
The unstable nature of the insurgency has caused the United States and other nations to
take a cautiously optimistic approach in dealing with the Syrian Opposition. Although the
United States is wary of arming the rebels, it announced that it would not protest the lifting of the
European Union (“EU”) arms embargo, which is scheduled to expire at the end of May 2013,
unless all 27 of its members renew it.168 Recently, the EU amended the sanctions to provide
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armored vehicles, non-lethal military assistance and technical aid to the opposition hoping it
would protect the Syrian people.169
Although the United States has not committed to arm the rebels, it has been, along with
British and French instructors, participating in the military training of senior Syrian army officers
who defected.170 The goal of the training is to eventually provide a “safe haven” for Syrian
refugees and to provide a “counterweight” to the extremist rebel forces in the Northern parts of
Syria. 171 In addition, the United States doubled their pledge to $250 million in non-lethal
assistance to the National Coalition and other civil society groups, including communications
and computer equipment, generators and medical supplies.172
Proponents of arming the rebels argue that the lack of arms shipments to the rebels has
caused negative military and political repercussions. The decision to not arm the rebels has
allowed the jihadists to grow stronger and caused the United States to lose out on an opportunity
to develop strategic relationships that could be valuable in a crucial post-Assad transitional
period.173 This viewpoint also argues that weapons should be given to the rebels to offset the
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military support that Assad has received from Iran and Russia, which has allowed him to survive
two years of uprisings.174
Before the United States would consider arming the rebels, it must ensure the opposition
is not dominated by extremist groups, but is comprised of groups “that are at least not hostile to
us and preferably support our principles.”175 In addition, foreign diplomats want to ensure the
rebel fighters respect the laws of war and human rights.176
The de-stabilization of Syria has also led to wide-ranging political consequences in the
region. The jihadist rebels increased presence in the northern parts of Syria has caused Israel to
adjust its foreign policy and has provided Turkey with a prominent international role.177 For
example, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently apologized to Turkish Prime
Minister Erdogan over an incident that occurred three years ago in an effort to restore diplomatic
ties with Turkey.178 In addition, both nations fear that if Assad’s regime fails, Syria’s chemical
weapons could fall into the hands of the jihadists.179 Since Turkey shares a border with Syria,
they need Israel’s military intelligence to monitor the transfer of the chemical weapons.
The international community’s political recognition of the National Coalition provided it
with a starting point to receive financial, humanitarian and political aid, but the recognition did
not provide a sufficient legal basis to provide it with arms. The National Coalition has acquired
political recognition and domestic legitimacy at the expense of developing a central governing
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structure that can work together with the provisional councils to administer the rebel controlled
areas.180 Rather than focusing on the pursuit of any further recognition, it should focus its efforts
on building relationships with the local councils and armed militias to demonstrate it can
effectively govern any portion of Syrian territory.181 If the National Coalition can increase its
support among the numerous minority groups and expand its governance and control of Syrian
territory, it will be able to make a much stronger case for its ability to receive arms.182
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